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Weighing the Public Interest
Is the Going Concern Opinion Still Relevant?

By Jodi L. Bellovary,
Don E. Giacomino, and
Michael D. Akers

n 1981, the AICPA addressed the issue
of going concern status through SAS
34, The Auditor's Considerations When
a Question Arises About an Entity's
Continued Existence. In 1988, the AlCPA
issued SAS 59, The Auditor 's
Consideration of an Entity's Ability to
Continue as a Going Concern, which
remains the authoritative guidance. To
determine if additional guidance on the
topic of going concern is provided by
accounting organizations, the authors contacted the AICPA and the state CPA societies (50 of 51 responded, including
Washington, D.C.). The authors found that
none of these organizations provide additional literature or guidance in this area.
Despite the preponderance of evidence
suggesting that the going concern opinion
lacks significant informative value, several individuals have called for additional
guidance in the area of going concern.
With each company failure shortly after the
issuance of a non-going concern audit
report, the public asks the question: "Where
were the auditors?" Conversely, a survey
of auditors found that the majority of
respondents consider current standards sufficient. Auditors believe that going concern
assessment requires significant judgment
and that each case must be reviewed on an
individual basis.

I

Authoritative Literature
Prior to SAS 34, the authoritative literature provided little guidance on when the
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auditor should consider modifying the
audit opinion based on uncertainty that the
entitiy could continue as a going concern. SAS 34 was issued in response to
the preponderance of cases where the auditor's judgment was called into question
after a business failure. SAS 34 in para-

graphs 7 and 8 required auditors to consider contrary information and mitigating
factors, and in paragraph 3 required management's plans when evidence of audit
procedures suggested there may be a question as to the company's ability to continue as a going concern. According to
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paragraph 4, contrary information included negative cash flow from operations,
recurring operating losses, debt default,
loss of key personnel, and litigation.
Paragraph 5 presents mitigating factors that
may offset the effects of contrary information, including the ability to dispose
of assets, the availability of sources for
borrowing or capital, and the capability
to reduce expenses or delay expenditures.
Paragraph 9 required auditors to review
management's response to the contrary
information (plans for asset disposal, borrowing, or delay of expenditures) to assess
the effects and feasibility of the plans.
Based on this evaluation, the auditor
must judge the appropriateness of modifying the audit opinion to indicate an
uncertainty about the entity's going concern status (paragraph 11).
Problems continued after the issuance of
SAS 34: "Questions [remained] about
whether auditors had been taking sufficient
responsibility for evaluating a client's ability to continue in existence"
("Documenting Compliance with SAS 59,"
by Fred Goldstein, The CPA Journal,
July 1989). Furthermore, companies were
still failing after receiving an unqualified
audit opinion. SAS 59 was one of the
nine "expectation gap auditing standards"
issued in 1988 to address the differences
between public expectations and auditors'
responsibilities. SAS 59 increases the auditor's responsibility for going concern evaluation in an effort to improve external auditor communications. Some, however,
believe that SAS 59 adds little to the
authoritative guidance. In "Going-Concern
Audit Report Recipients Before and After
SAS No. 59" [The National Public
Accountant 43 (8): 24--25 (l998)], Marshall
K. Geiger, Kannan Raghunandan, and
Dasartha V. Rama state that going concern
assessment was a part of practice before
SAS 59, saying the statement "appears to
have only codified existing practice." The
authors attempted to gain more information from the AICPA on the response to
the issuance of SAS 59 through the original comment letters; unfortunately, they
are no longer available.
There are three noteworthy changes
from SAS 34 to SAS 59. [See "The
Expectation Gap Auditing Standards," by
Dan Guy and J. Sullivan, Journal of
Accountancy 165 (4) 1988; "The

Auditor's Going-Concern Decision: A
Review and Implications for Future
Research," by S. Asare, Journal of
Accounting Literature 9: 39-64, 1990;
"How to Evaluate Going Concern," by J.
Ellingsen, Kurt Pany, and P. Fagan,
Journal of Accountancy 167 (1) 1989;
"Understanding SAS No. 59: The
Auditor's Going Concern
Responsibilities," by S. Robison, The
Practical Accountant 22 (9) 1989.]
First, SAS 59 requires auditors to consider going concern status for every audit
engagement. SAS 34 required going concern consideration only when audit procedures indicated that there may be a
question as to the company's going concern status. SAS 59, paragraph 5, does
not require, however, that audit procedures be designed specifically to address
the going concern issue. Therefore, the
change from SAS 34 to SAS 59 is not a
requirement of additional audit procedures, but rather a requirement of going
concern consideration in every audit.
Second, SAS 59 requires that the audit
report be modified if there is substantial
doubt about the entity's going concern
status. SAS 34 required a qualified audit
report if there was uncertainty regarding
the recoverability of assets and the classification of liabilities. Third, SAS 59
requires an explanatory paragraph in the
audit report regarding the substantial
doubt; SAS 34 merely required a qualified "subject to" opinion.

The Impact of SAS 34 and SAS 59
Several studies have been conducted to
determine how SAS 34 and SAS 59
affect audit reports. As the authoritative
guidance places more responsibility on
auditors, one would expect auditors to issue
more going concern-modified audit reports
[see Joseph V. Carcello, Dana R.
Hermanson, and H. Fenwick Huss,
"Temporal Changes in Bankruptcy-Related
Reporting," Auditing: A Journal of Practice
and Theory 14 (2) 1995, and Raghunandan
and Rama, "Audit Reports for Companies
in Financial Distress: Before and After
SAS No. 59," Auditing: A Journal of
Practice and Theory, 14 (1) 1995]. The
work of Raghunandan and Rama supports this expectation; they found that auditors are more likely to issue going concern
opinions post-SAS 59 than pre-SAS 59.

Carcello et al. provide evidence that
auditors were more likely to issue going
concern-modified audit reports post-SAS
34 than pre-SAS 34. Contrary to
Raghunandan and Rama's results, however, Carcello et al. found the likelihood to
modify audit reports is not significantly different when comparing pre-SAS 59 to
post-SAS 59. Geiger et al. reported similar results, and found that the mean probabilities of bankruptcy pre-SAS 59 and
post-SAS 59 are not significantly different. They go on to state that this "indicat[es] that auditors [are] not issuing goingconcern modified opinions to differently
stressed clients after the implementation of
SAS No. 59."
Other studies that investigated whether
the going concern opinion adds value to
the decision-making process have yielded mixed results. Kevin C.W. Chen and
Brian K. Church found that the market's
reaction is less severe when a going
concern opinion has been issued as
opposed to when a non-going concern
opinion has been given. They concluded

Studies that
investigated whether the
going concern opinion
adds value to the
decision-making process
have yielded mixed
results.

that the going concern opinion has
informative value to explain excess
returns around a bankruptcy filing. [See
"Going Concern Opinions and the
Market's Reaction to Bankruptcy
Filings," The Accounting Review 71 (1)
1996. See also Peter Dodd, Nicholas
Dopuch, Robert Holthausen, and Richard
Leftwich, "Qualified Audit Opinions and
Stock Prices," Journal of Accounting and
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Economics 6 (I) 1984; Dopuch,
Holthausen, and Leftwich, "Predicting
Audit Qualifications with Financial and
Market Variables," The Accounting
Review 62 (3) 1987; Michael Firth,
"Qualified Audit Reports: Their Impact
on Investment Decisions," The
Accounting Review 53 (3) 1978; Lon
Holder-Webb and Mike Wilkins, "The
Incremental Information Content of
SAS No. 59 Going-Concern Opinions,"
Journal of Accounting Research 38 (1)
2000; and William Hopwood, James
McKeown, and Jane Mutchler, "A Test
of the Incremental Explanatory Power
of Opinions Qualified for Consistency
and Uncertainty," The Accounting Review
64(1) 1989.]
Betty C. Brown and Alan S. Levitan
["An Investigation into the Effect of

no valuable information to the decisionmaking process. Clive S. Lennox ["The
Accuracy and Incremental Information
Content of Audit Reports in Predicting
Bankruptcy," Journal of Business
Finance & Accounting, 26 (5-6) 1999]
found that a change in going concern
qualification has no significant impact
and therefore concluded that the audit
report modified for going concern does
not provide valuable information. [See
also Max Bessell, Asokan Anandarajan,
and Ahson Umar, "Information Content,
Audit Reports and Going-Concern: An
Australian Study," Accounting and
Finance, 43, 2003; R.R. Davis, "An
Empirical Evaluation of Auditors'
Subject-to Opinions," Auditing: A
Journal of Practice & Theory, 2 (1)
1982; R.Z. Elias and J. Johnston, "Is

More than 40% of public
companies that filed for bankruptcy between
January 1, 2001, and June 30, 2002, received
unqualified opinions on their most recent
audit report.

'Going Concern' Qualifications on the
Stock Market," The Woman CPA, 48 (3)
1986] reported that companies that receive
going concern opinions show significantly poorer market performance than
companies that do not receive going
concern opinions. Brown and Levitan,
however, concluded that the auditor's
opinion may not be the only factor affecting performance, because the differences
in performance begin three to five weeks
prior to year-end. [See also C. Chow and
S. Rice, "Qualified Audit Opinions and
Share Prices-An Investigation,"
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory,
I (2) 1982.]
The preponderance of evidence suggests that the going concern opinion adds
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There Incremental Information Content
in the Going Concern Explanatory
Paragraph?" Advances in Accounting, 18,
2001; and 1. Elliott, '''SUbject to' Audit
Opinions and Abnormal Security
Returns-Outcomes and Ambiguities,"
Journal of Accounting Research, 20 (2,
II) 1982.]

Arguments for Additional Guidance
Despite evidence suggesting that the
going concern opinion does not have informative value, several individuals have criticized the current literature and called for
additional guidance in the area of going
concern. Hian Chye Koh and Larry N.
Killough ["The Use of Multiple
Discriminant Analysis in the Assessment

of the Going-Concern Status of an Audit
Client," Journal of Business Finance &
Accounting, 17 (2) 1990] asserted that
the problems with SAS 34 continue to
appear with SAS 59 because the statements contain essentially the same guidance. This assertion would appear valid
given that the same questions that arose
after SAS 34 was released continue to be
asked post-SAS 59:
• Where are the auditors?
• Why are businesses failing shortly after
receiving an audit report that does not indicate substantial doubt about the entity's
ability to continue as a going concern?
• Are auditors taking enough responsibility for going concern assessment?
Jonathan Weil ('''Going Concerns'Did Accountants Fail to Flag Problems
at Dot-com Casualties?" Wall Street
Journal, February 9, 2001) reported that
during the wave of "dot-com" failures
in 2000, only three of the 10 publicly held
dot-com companies that filed for
bankruptcy received going concern
opinions on their most recent audit report.
In some cases, the going concern opinion comes too late. Weil referred to one
case in which the company had a fiscal
year ending in June. The company
received a going concern opinion released
in October, and went bankrupt in
November. Another critic, Martin D.
Weiss of Weiss Ratings, Inc., in "The
Worsening Crisis of Confidence on
Wall Street" (2002), stated that more than
40% of public companies that filed for
bankruptcy between January I, 2001, and
June 30, 2002, received unqualified opinions on their most recent audit report.
Weiss called this a "breakdown with
disastrous consequences" and recommended creating a clearer definition of
the auditor's responsibility. Weiss submitted his report to the U.S. Senate during its debate of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
(SOA), in support of the new legislation. The Senate used Weiss' report as
part of the consideration for the controls
put in place by SOA. If the situation is
so "disastrous," why did Congress not
factor the issue of going concern assessment into the new legislation?
Elizabeth Venuti, in "The GoingConcern Assumption Revisited:
Assessing a Company's Future Viability"
(The CPA Journal, May 2004), reported
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that, post-SAS 59, nearly 50% of
bankrupt companies did not receive a
qualified going concern opinion on their
most recent audit report. She also points
out that "twelve of the 20 largest
bankruptcy filings in U.S. history took
place in 2001 and 2002," and that none
of the 12 received qualified going concern opinions on their most recent audit
report. Venuti believes the issue goes
much deeper, stating "modifications to
the concept statements and auditing standards appear to be necessary." She refers
to the International Standards on Auditing
(ISA), which provides in its glossary the
following definition of the going concern
assumption:
Under the going concern assumption, an
entity is ordinarily viewed as continuing
in business for the foreseeable future with
neither the intention nor the necessity of
liquidation, ceasing trading, or seeking
protection from creditors pursuant to laws
or regulations. Accordingly, assets and
liabilities are recorded on the basis that
the entity will be able to realize its
assets and discharge its liabilities in the
normal course of business.
Venuti questions whether companies
such as WorldCom and Enron would have
received a going concern opinion had SAS
59 used "similar language."

Practitioners' Views on the Need for
Additional Guidance
Given the published criticism of the current authoritative guidance, the authors
decided to obtain professionals' points of
view regarding the authoritative guidance
relating to going concern. The authors surveyed the top 100 accounting firms (in
2004, according to Accounting Today)
regarding the firms' policies and procedures for assessing the going concern status of clients. Exhibit 1 presents the survey results.
Of the 22 respondents that use a formal
checklist to assess the going concern status of clients , 15 use Practitioners
Publishing Company's (PPC) Going
Concern Checklist CX-19, a standardized
questionnaire that outlines the guidance in
SAS 59. Seven of the respondents had
developed internal checklists. (One respondent uses the PPC checklist as well as an
internally generated checklist; one did not
provide a copy of the checklist used.) Four

of the internally generated checklists closely follow SAS 59, similar to the PPC
checklist.
Seven of the 26 respondents indicated
a desire for additional professional guidance. Two respondents communicated
confusion as to whether the one-year
timeframe used for going concern evaluation extends from the financial statement date or from the audit report date,
and wanted additional guidance on the
timeframe to be considered. One respondent wanted to see more practical considerations and specific guidance.
Another respondent expressed a desire for
additional guidance on how to deal with
clients on this issue.
The majority of respondents (19 of 26),
however, believed that current authoritative guidance in this area is sufficient and
did not want to see additional professional guidance. The overwhelming response
was that going concern is an area requiring significant judgment. These respondents believed that each case was unique,
requiring individual consideration. Cassell
Bryan-Low, in "Auditors Fail to Foresee
Bankruptcies" (Wall Street Journal, July
II, 2002), reported similar reactions from
practice: "A KPMG spokesman ... said .. .
'the going-concern clause ... requires a
great deal of judgment and is not something to be taken lightly.'" The spokesman
also pointed out that critics make "unfair
conclusions based on a tiny percentage of
the thousands of audits performed each

year by the profession," thus raising the
question, "Is there really a need for additional guidance, or are critics referring to
isolated situations?"

Is Litigation a Concern?
In the case of a business failure, auditors are exposed to the risk that financial
statement users will sue them for not
issuing a going concern opinion to warn
users that the entity may not continue in
existence for another year beyond the
date of the audited financial statements.
There is also the chance that a company
will sue its auditor for issuing a going concern opinion "in error" (i.e., when the client
does not fail). To assess the risks of litigation, the authors searched for data regarding auditor litigation cases and outcomes.
They began with searches of Internet
search engines, journaVnewspaper databases, and the SEC website for the topics of
"going concern" and "auditor litigation."
The authors also contacted the SEC directly via telephone to substantiate the findings of the SEC website search, which
returned no instances of auditor litigation
for going concern issues. Per the conversation with the SEC, auditor litigation for
going concern issues is not a primary
concern or focus for the SEC.
The authors also searched the auditor litigation database compiled by Zoe-Vonna
Palrnrose ("Empirical Research in
Auditor Litigation: Considerations and
Data," Studies in Accounting Research #33,

EXHIBIT 1
Survey of Top 100 Accounting Firms

Question

Finns Responding (26 total)
Yes

No

Does your firm currently use a formal checklist to
assess the going concern status of your clients?*

22

4

Do you believe that current authoritative guidance
in this area is sufficient?

21

45

7

19

Would you like to see additional professional
guidance on how to evaluate going concern status?

* One respondent that indicated the use of a checklist is optional is irfcluded among -Yes' respondents.
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American Accounting Association, 1999),
which includes 1,071 instances of auditor
litigation involving the Big Eight fInns and
audits from 1960 through 1995. A keyword
search of "going concern" returned 41
cases, 14 of which were fraud-related,
where fraud was the primary focus of the
case; the going concern issue played a secondary role. In fraud cases, the procedures for evaluating going concern status
are not useful and the opinion is not meaningful. A review of the 27 cases that were
not fraud-related showed that 10 had going
concern as a primary issue, not just as
part of a long list of other issues. In fIve
of the 10 cases, the case was either dismissed or the auditor was not held liable.
In three of the cases, the auditors settled
for amounts up to $5 million. In the other
two cases, the outcomes were unknown. In
conclusion, less than one-half of 1% of the
1,071 cases involved successful litigation
of auditors for going concern issues.
An examination of articles regarding
auditor litigation revealed few instances
of litigation for going concern issues.
CarceIlo and Palmrose, in "Auditor
Litigation and Modified Reporting on
Bankrupt Clients" [Journal of Accounting
Research 32 (Supplement) 1994], found
that out of 655 public companies that went
bankrupt between 1972 and 1992 and were
audited by "Big" fIrms, 83 received going
concern opinions on their last financial
statement before bankruptcy or litigation.
Of the 83 companies that received going
concern opinions, only fIve were the subject of auditor litigation. Carcello and
Palmrose do not provide specifIcs or the
outcomes of the cases.
According to the SEC, the Private

Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
makes it "more difficult ... for private
plaintiffs to assert civil claims against auditors," allowing auditors to have even less concern for the risk of litigation. In fact, in
"Going-Concern Opinions in the 'New'
Legal Environment" [Accounting Horizons,
16(1) 2002], Geiger and Raghunandan found
that auditors were more than twice as likely
to issue a going concern opinion before the
1995 reform act was passed as after.
Exhibit 2 shows that 9.5% of companies in
the sample received a going concern opinion before the reform act was passed, while
only 3.5% of companies received one after.
Geiger and Raghunandan concluded that the
reform act relieved auditors' concern for
exposure to litigation and has led auditors
to issue fewer going concern opinions. The
results of this study, combined with the low
number of cases of auditor litigation for going
concern issues, has led the authors to believe
that litigation in this area is not a serious
threat to practitioners.

Prediction Models
Bankruptcy and going concern prediction
have been researched for decades. An
increased interest in prediction models began
with the development of Beaver's univariate model in 1966 and Altman's multivariate discriminant analysis model in 1968.
The authors found more than 50 models
available for bankruptcy or going concern
prediction. The models employ various
methodologies, including multivariate discriminant analysis, logit analysis; probit analysis, neural networks, and hybrid systems.
The number of factors considered ranges
from two to 32 item~. These prediction models could help auditors anticipate fInancial

EXHIBIT 2
Results of Geiger and Raghunandan Study (2002)

Number of companies in sample
Percentage that received a going
concern opinion

I
20

1992-1993
(Before
Reform Act)

1996-1997
(Transition
Period)

1999-2000
(After
Reform Act)

662

574

635

9.5%

5.5%

3.5%

problems and going concern issues earlier.
Many of these models have demonstrated
predictive ability as high as 90% to 100%
in classifying bankrupt (or going concern)
and nonbankrupt (or non-going concern)
companies.
So why are these models not being
used? One reason might be a basic lack
of awareness of the models or of their
predictive ability. Perhaps if the models
received more exposure they would be
more widely used. Another explanation
could be resistance to change. The
authors found that auditors do not desire
additional guidance in the area of going
concern, which implies that they are satisfIed with current standards. Furthermore,
auditors believe that going concern
assessment is an area requiring signifIcant
subjective judgment. As such, they believe
that the use of prediction models would
remove professional judgment from the
consideration of going concern.
The apparent lack of use of the models
could also be attributed to auditors' worries
that a qualified going concern opinion can
become a self-fulfIlling prophecy. Auditors
may be reluctant to use a model that may
indicate the need to issue a going concern
opinion due to fear that such an opinion
will preclude the client from obtaining
fInancing required to tum around the company's fInancial situation. [See K. Menon
and K. Schwartz, "The Auditor's Report
for Companies Facing Bankruptcy," Journal
of Commercial Bank Lending, 68 (5)
1986.] In addition, companies are likely to
pressure their auditor to not issue a going
concern opinion, placing the auditor in the
difficult position of trying to keep the client
happy while protecting the public interest.
Another reason could be that the models make heavy use of ratios and, according to interviews conducted by Mutchler:
"[A]uditors by and large [do] not like ratio
analysis." The auditors that Mutchler interviewed thought that their "insider" access
to the company provided far more information than ratio analysis could provide.
Richard Morris, in "Forecasting
Bankruptcy: How Useful Are Failure
Prediction Models?" [Management
Accounting, 76 (5) 1998], provided several other reasons for prediction models'
disuse despite their apparent predictive
abilities. Morris stated that the widespread
use of such models would cause their use-
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fulness to quickly vanish because as more
people use the models they would cease
to provide an advantage. He also pointed out that most models are developed
by considering data from a variety of
industries, which can influence the results
because not all industries behave in a
similar manner; "normal" ratios can vary
dramatically across industries.
Furthermore, the data are drawn from a
number of years, and average performance can change over time.
Although auditors could use a prediction
model to justify the going concern opinion
to the client or in court, the use of a
model could make it more difficult to justify not issuing a going concern opinion.
M. Jennings, D. Kneer, and P. Reekers,
in "The Significance of Audit Decision
Aids and Precase Jurists' Attitudes on
Perceptions of Audit Firm Culpability
and Liability" [Contemporary Accounting
Research, 9 (2) 1993] suggest that practitioners are reluctant to use decisions aids

By issuing a going
concern opinion, auditors
are interjecting
themselves into the
decision-making
process.

(such as prediction models) because outside parties may view these tools as having the same effect as standards and penalize auditors for wavering from the guidance provided by a model. Lowe et al. corroborate this suggestion, stating that "if
firms develop and use decision aids, then
they may be constrained to adhere fully
to the decision aids' recommendations, as
these aids may serve as implied standards
of performance in future litigation." As discussed above, there is not a high risk of

litigation against the practitioner for either
the issuance or nonissuance of a going concern opinion.
In summary, with a low risk of litigation, and potential increased accountability from the use of a nonrequired prediction model, why would the auditor
choose to do so?

Cohen Commission Recommendations
In 1978, the Commission on Auditors'
Responsibilities (Cohen Commission) provided recommendations for improving and
specifying the responsibilities of independent auditors. One area in which
changes were recommended was reporting on uncertainties, including going concern uncertainties. The Cohen
Commission recommended eliminating
from the audit report the "subject to" qualification relating to uncertainties. In 1988,
the AICPA implemented this recommendation by no longer requiring use of a
"subject to" qualified opinion to indicate
substantial doubt about the entity's
going concern status. As mentioned
above, SAS 59 now requires a modified
audit report with an explanatory paragraph
regarding the going concern status.
The Cohen Commission further suggested the following:
If uncertainty about a company's ability to continue operations is adequately disclosed in its financial statements,
the auditor should not be required to
call attention to that uncertainty in his
report.... If the auditor does not believe
disclosure is sufficient to portray the
company's financial position, he should
modify his opinion because the financial statements do not present the
company's financial position in conformity with generally accepted
accounting principles.
If this recommendation were implemented, the audit report would address the
going concern issue only if the situation
is not disclosed adequately in the financial statements. If the financial statement
disclosures were complete, there would
be no change to the audit report with regard
to going concern.

Recommendations
The authors believe that the Cohen
Commission's recommendations should
be revisited and the going concern opin-

ion should be eliminated. The auditor's
job is to assess whether the financial
statements are presented in accordance
with GAAP, not to judge the financial
condition of the company. Statement of
Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC)
I, paragraph 33, states that one objective of financial reporting is to provide
useful information for decision making.
However, it goes on to state that "it is not
a function of financial reporting to try to
determine or influence the outcomes of
those decisions. The role of financial
reporting requires it to provide evenhanded, neutral, or unbiased information."
By issuing a going concern opinion, auditors are interjecting themselves into the
decision-making process. If the financial
statements are prepared in accordance
with GAAP and provide useful information, the reader should be able to assess
the company's financial condition.
The authors further believe that the
going concern opinion does not provide
useful information, and therefore does not
meet the objective of SFAC I. Often, market signals already indicate a possible
impending failure, making the going concern opinion a lagging indicator. This situation is even more enhanced by today's
technology and the ability to acquire information instantaneously via the Intemet. The
authors also consider the timeframe for the
consideration of going concem too short to
be useful. Many companies may appear
to be "failing" in the near term of one year,
but bankruptcy may take much longer or
the company may turn around and avoid
bankruptcy.
After weighing the above factors and the
evidence that the going concern opinion
lacks informative value, the authors ask:
Why do auditors need to modify the audit
report for going concern? Considering that
litigation is not a serious threat, one can
see that eliminating the going concern opinion is the favorable option.
0
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